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that influenced their writing, the public for which each wrote, and the humor of each.

Paper: Pagan Survivals in Modern Greek Religion, by Professor W. A. ELLIOTT, of Allegheny College.

The author will describe, from personal observation, religious practices and beliefs among the modern Greeks which are strikingly like those of ancient times. Conclusion: Modern Greek religion is essentially pagan.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 28, AT 2:00

Paper: On the Misery of Pedagogues, by Professor W. W. BAKER, of Haverford College.

A discussion of material drawn from Aristophanes, Theophrastus, St. Augustine, Roger Ascham, and especially from a very human document by Michael Neander, on the relation between teacher and pupils.

Paper: The New Problems of the Secondary Latin Teacher, in First Year and Second Year Latin, by Miss MARY L. BREENE, of the Peabody High School, Pittsburgh.

Points to be considered are the change in the type of students beginning Latin; the effect of the elective system now in full vogue; the lack of proper advice to students concerning elections; and the effects of certain administrative practices.

Paper: Good Teaching the One Sure Means of Inspiring in Beginners Lasting Interest in Latin, by Miss JESSIE E. ALLEN, Philadelphia High School for Girls.

The paper will urge that, to succeed as a teacher, the Secondary School teacher must have rich scholarship, wide interests, and an accurate knowledge of present-day educational movements.

Paper: A Syllabus for the First Two Years of Latin Work, by Dr. S. DWIGHT ARMS, of the University of the State of New York, Albany, N. Y.

A discussion of the principles that should underlie a syllabus and of characteristic features of such a syllabus.

On Friday morning there will be a specially conducted tour through the Classical Collections of the Carnegie Institute. The party will start at 10:30, from the check room near the main entrance on Forbes Street.

SPECIAL FOR SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 28

The Classical Club of the Pennsylvania College for Women will present the *Menaechmi* of Plautus, in Latin, at the College, on Saturday evening, at 8 o'clock. Members of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States and of The Classical Association of Pittsburgh and Vicinity are cordially invited to be present. Tickets may be secured, without charge, by applying to Professor B. L. Ullman, University of Pittsburgh. One ticket has been sent to every member of each Association, with a copy of the official programme.

It remains now for the members of the two Associations to bestir themselves, and to be present in force, with their friends, at the meeting. By this time, probably, all members of both Associations have received a copy of the programme, which gives detailed information concerning the location of the University, the best ways to reach the University from the railroad

stations, hotel rates, the meeting place at the University, etc. Additional copies of the programme may be had from Professor B. L. Ullman, of the University of Pittsburgh, who is in charge of arrangements on the ground, or from Professor Evan T. Sage, Secretary of The Classical Association of Pittsburgh, whose address is the University of Pittsburgh, or from Professor Knapp.

Special attention is called to the dinner on Friday night, at the Hotel Schenley. This is open to every one, at \$1.25 per person. Also on Saturday luncheon will be served to members and friends at the Hotel Schenley, at 75 cents per person.

Those who intend to be present at the dinner or the luncheon, or at both, should notify Professor Ullman, about the dinner by Thursday, April 26, at the latest, about the luncheon by Friday evening, April 27, at the latest. It will help greatly if remittance in full is made when notice of intention to be present is sent. C. K.

DETERMINED FUTURITY IN GREEK

More than one suggestion of value to the student of comparative syntax is to be found in the discussion of *shall* and *will* by Professor Bradley¹. One of these is contained in the following quotations:

They <i.e. the meanings of English modal auxiliaries> are all concerned primarily with the forces which determine or condition human action. And these forces are, in the last analysis, of two sorts only: external, in the guise of necessity, opportunity, and the pressure of foreign wills, on the one hand; and, on the other, the inward springs of action in knowledge, conscious power, and desire.

<In earlier English> whatever was regarded as programmed or predestined, was expressed by *shall*. Whatever was to come about through the will or consent of the agent, was expressed by *will*.

The old-time clear-cut distinction between things which *shall be*, whether ordained by fate, or directed by authority, or merely announced on the programme, on the one hand; and, on the other, things which we *will to do*, was a singularly sound and valuable distinction, which it seems a great pity to lose out of our language or allow to become hopelessly obscured.

The modal meaning brought into contrast with the volitive in the last two quotations may be compared with that which Professor Sonnenschein² claims as the meaning of the Latin subjunctive *per se* and to which he gives the name of Obligation. A number of comments on Sonnenschein's theory will serve as an introduction to the present study.

(1) From a reading of Professor Sonnenschein's book one might be led to think that by *obligation* he means external obligation as distinguished from will, or wish. The term used is unfortunate; it is almost certain to be misunderstood. The term 'determined futurity' Sonnenschein uses in a sense equivalent to that

¹Shall and Will—An Historical Study, T. A. P. A. (= Transactions American Philological Association), 42.5-31.

²In his monograph, *The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive*. The monograph has been reviewed in America by C. E. Bennett, in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 7.132-134, and by H. C. Nutting, in *Classical Philology* 6.113-115. Concerning the meaning which Sonnenschein attaches to the term obligation, see also *The Classical Review* 24.217.

of 'natural necessity'. But that which is bound to be or to happen, whether through a law of nature or of some other force, may be said to be determined. I therefore propose the term 'determined futurity' as the designation of this modal meaning.

(2) But Sonnenschein really extends the meaning of obligation so as to cover not only the external "forces which determine or condition human action" but also "the inward springs of action". In the last analysis this is to make 'obligation' synonymous with 'modal meaning'. In Latin and elsewhere we must recognize not alone the *shall* meaning but others as well.

(3) That which determines that something is bound to happen, as fate, custom, etc., may be called a determinant. Now, in an expression of determined futurity, the determinant may be nothing more than the course of action adopted by the speaker himself. 'I am to do this' may mean 'I am to do this in accordance with my own plan of action'. This *personal* determinant Sonnenschein does not recognize.

(4) In seeking to establish a unity for the Latin subjunctive, Sonnenschein supposes that the Indo-European subjunctive and optative inflexions originally had the same meaning and were differentiated in Greek. But this is unnecessary even from his own point of view. It might be true for Latin that the determined futurity meaning of the subjunctive forms developed from the will meaning of the subjunctive and that the same meaning of optative forms developed from the wish meaning of the optative.

(5) Sonnenschein himself in his study of the Latin subjunctive asks no help from Greek or other Indo-European language; but one who believes in the comparative method for the study of syntax, in case he acknowledges the presence of the determined futurity meaning in Latin, will at once wish to fit this fact into his scheme of comparative syntax. Particularly he will wish to know what place if any was occupied by this meaning in the histories of the Greek subjunctive and optative. He will expect, too, that knowledge of this sort will establish on a firmer foundation whatever is sound of Sonnenschein's theory. The object of the present paper, then, is to show for Greek that the subjunctive, starting with the *will* meaning, developed the meaning of *determined futurity*, that the optative, starting with the *wish* meaning, did the same thing, and that the optative developed still another meaning, that of *contingent determined futurity*.

Acceptance of this view will depend, of course, on a consideration of the examples themselves. But three general considerations may be mentioned in advance. (1) The use of $\delta\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ with the non-wish optative and with the non-will subjunctive is an indication of a similarity, at least, in their meanings³. (2) Will and wish are after all varieties of the same thing, desire.

Psychologically no hard and fast line can be drawn between them; there is no antecedent reason against their shifting to the same meaning. (3) The universal tendency of the Indo-European languages to adopt one mood in place of the two points to a tendency on the part of the meanings of the two moods to fall together.

A. The Greek Subjunctive of Determined Futurity

The material to be dealt with here consists of subjunctives in Homeric Greek accompanied for the most part by $\delta\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ and having as a negative, in case one is present, $\omicron\upsilon$, and having a non-volitive meaning; but dependent clauses will be almost entirely omitted from the discussion in this paper. The most thorough treatment of this subjunctive is that of Professor Hale⁴. Delbrück, in the first volume of his *Syntaktische Forschungen*, had given the name of Subjunctive of Expectation to this subjunctive. In his *Vergleichende Syntax* he adopts Hale's treatment and the name Prospective, which Sonnenschein⁵ had applied to the meaning of the mood of certain Latin subordinate clauses. Hale's conception of the modal meaning is contained in the following words:

In independent sentences in Homeric Greek, the subjunctive of anticipation, when declarative, expresses a confident expectation of a future occurrence.

Others⁶ apply the designation 'future' to this subjunctive; and, indeed, it is difficult even in the treatment of Hale and of Delbrück to determine just what it is which in their conception differentiates this modal meaning from a purely temporal one.

The subjunctive of determined futurity is used to indicate that something is *bound to happen*, that a future event is *determined by some law* external, at the time of speaking, to the speaker. Such a meaning is easily derived from that of *will*. In an expression of *will*, the speaker has in mind the bringing about of the state or action desired. Two cases are to be distinguished. (1) The speaker may seek to influence the will of another in order to bring about the desired act or situation. (2) He may not seek to influence the will of another. In this case the desired act or situation will be seen to be (a) one to be brought about by the speaker's own activity, or (b) one under the control of forces not subject to the speaker directly or indirectly.

When the desired act or situation is one depending on his own activity, the speaker may reach a determination or adopt a course of action, and his expression of will then will be made more or less in view of that determination. Under such circumstances a shift from the modal meaning of *will* to one which might be expressed in English by 'I am bound to (in accordance with my adopted course of action)' would seem to be very easy. This shift took place in the case of the subjunctive.

³Compare Monro, *Homeric Grammar* 362: "Hence with the Subj. and Opt. $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$ or $\delta\upsilon$ indicates that an event holds a *definite* place in the expected course of things: in other words, $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$ or $\delta\upsilon$ points to an *actual occurrence* in the future".

⁴The Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin (referred to below by the abbreviation Ant.).

⁵In *The Classical Review* 7.8.

⁶Compare especially C. E. Bennett, S. E. L. (= *Syntax of Early Latin*) 1.145-161.

The developed meaning we may call *Personal Determined Futurity*.

Naturally examples of personal determined futurity will for the most part have the first person singular.

As an indication of the closeness of relationship of this meaning to that from which it was derived may be cited three examples (without *ἄν* or *κε*): Od. 12.383, 2.222; Il. 9.121. (It is assumed that readers of this paper will have the text of the Iliad and the Odyssey at hand. Considerations of space make it impossible to print passages in extenso). These three passages Delbrück (Verg. Syn. 2.368) classes as "prospektiv" because of the absence of the introductory *ἄγε*. Hale (Ant. 14, n.) sees the volitive meaning in the two examples from the Odyssey.

Clear cases of the subjunctive of personal determined futurity are Il. 1.183-184, 'Her with my ship and my comrades shall I send back; but I (in accordance with the course of action adopted by me) *am* to take⁷ Briseis of the fair cheeks'; Il. 16.129, 'Put on your armor quickly, and I (in accordance with my plan) *shall*⁸ (*am to*) summon the army'; Il. 1.324, 'And if he does not give her up, I, myself, *am bound* to seize her'.

Other examples are Od. 17.418; Il. 14.235.

But such a modal meaning need not be confined to the first person singular. One may say that another person is bound to do or suffer something and have in mind his own activity as tending to bring about that act. Probable examples with the second and with the third person are Il. 11.433, 7.197. Another possible example is Il. 15.351.

It is to be noted that these expressions of personal determined futurity and especially those with the first person singular set forth the *resolve* of the speaker in a more emphatic way than could be done by the volitive: this is true just because they indicate a deliberate choice.

When one expresses his will in regard to an act or situation not under his control directly or indirectly, the idea of will is weakened. But of course in many cases the act or situation is not clearly beyond the power of the speaker to control. It is reasonable to suppose that the subjunctive expressing *will* came to be used in cases of this sort and then passed on to use in cases which were altogether beyond the speaker's control and were seen to be determined by fate, natural law, deity, custom, or ethics. With the weakening of will, under these circumstances, was developed the meaning of *Impersonal*⁹ Determined Futurity, determined futurity used with an impersonal determinant.

We should expect to find examples of impersonal determined futurity most commonly with the second or

the third person. Compare Od. 10.50, 'The breath of Boreas shall (is to, is destined to) bear her onward'; Il. 1.205, 'By his own haughty acts is he bound soon to lose his life'.

Other examples with the third person are Il. 22.505, 3.54, 11.387, 24.655, 19.151 (?), 18.308; Od. 4.389, 391, 692. There are three or four examples of *τις εἰπῆσι* in the sense of 'someone is bound to say', though none of these has *ἄν* or *κε*: Il. 6.459, 7.87; Od. 6.275; and possibly Il. 6.479, where some read *εἰποι*.

In the following example there is no real shift in the modal meaning. The assertion is made concerning a matter toward which the speaker might well be opposed. *In effect*, therefore, the expression of determined futurity gives the speaker's consent. Compare Od. 1.394:

τῶν κέν τις τὸδ' ἔχρησιν, ἐπεὶ θάνα δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς

'Some one of whom, since royal Odysseus now is dead, shall have this kingship'. The expression of mutually exclusive alternatives, as in Od. 14.183-184, 4.80, and Il. 9.701, carries an implication of indifference.

Examples of the impersonal determined futurity with second person are to be seen in Il. 3.417, 24.550. Apparently only one example of the first person can be placed here, Il. 1.262: οὐ γὰρ πω τοιοῦτος ἴδον ἀνέρας οὐδὲ ἰδῶμαι.

In an expression of impersonal determined futurity it is necessarily granted that the act can be performed. Now, if in any way attention is called to effort on the part of the agent, there arises the implication of *ability* on the part of the agent to overcome any opposing circumstances, or, if we look at the matter from the other side, the implication of the inability of circumstances to overcome the agent's efforts, the implication of *opportunity*. Particularly will a negative call attention to the agent's effort and so will serve to give an implication of absence of ability or of opportunity. Compare Od. 11.328, 'I am not to tell or name (though I try)', 'I can not', 'I may not'.

Similar are Od. 11.517, 4.240; Il. 2.488.

In the next example (Od. 6.201-202) the lack of capacity is really implied in the descriptive relative clause *ὅς . . . ἔκρηται*. The implication which would justify a translation of 'never *can* be' for *οὐδὲ γένηται* is secondary. The sense is 'The man never is to be who can come'. Od. 16.437 is similar, but with the future in the relative clause.

The 'can-may' implication in a descriptive clause with the subjunctive of determined futurity is seen also in Il. 23.345, 'There is none that shall (be able to) overtake you'.

The implication of capacity or opportunity appears in a clause virtually relative in Il. 18.192¹⁰ and in an indirect question in Il. 15.403¹¹.

⁷For the increasing frequency in the use of the infinitive with forms of the verb *to be* to express the programmed future, see Bradley, T. A. P. A. 42.23.

⁸Compare Skeat, Etymological Dictionary: "Hence mod. Eng. *I shall* properly means *I am to*, *I must*, as distinguished from *I will*". See also Sonnenschein, Unity, 7.

⁹Compare Delbrück, N. J. (= Neue Jahrbücher) 9.333; Bradley, T. A. P. A. 42.16-17. Delbrück recognizes the weakening of the idea of will under the circumstances indicated above, but apparently sees nothing as a result but a pure temporal (future) meaning. He fails also to distinguish the personal from the impersonal use of the subjunctive with *ἄν* or *κε*.

¹⁰Cf. Hale, T. A. P. A., 24.174, and Ant. 58.

¹¹I hope to discuss the use of the subjunctive in interrogative sentences at another time. For the present it may be noted that the 'can-may' implication in the *πῶς* questions with the subjunctive comes through the negative implication. Compare Il. 18.188, 'How am I to go into the fray? They have my arms'. 'How can I go?' So Il. 1.150; Od. 16.70. Compare Frank, C. P. 2.179; Sonnenschein, Unity, 28, n.

In asserting that an act is bound to take place, it is assumed theoretically that all the determining factors¹² are taken into consideration. As a matter of fact, of course, one does not do this. It is an easy step from the expression of a determined futurity in which it is assumed that all the determining factors are taken into account to one in which the assumption is given up and the implication is that the predication is based on a consideration of *some* determining factors, others being left out of consideration. I propose the name Contingent Determined Futurity for this modal meaning.

There is no evidence that the Greek subjunctive acquired this meaning; but in a few cases it is possible to see a tendency in that direction. So LLM. (= Lang, Leaf, and Myers) translate Il. 24.655 with "would"; Palmer so translates the subjunctive in Il. 4.388. The negative and subjunctive in Il. 2.488 are translated by Lang, Leaf, and Myers with "could" not, and Butcher and Lang so translate the subjunctive and negative of Od. 4.240, 11.517. But the 'could' meaning has the same relation to the 'would' meaning as the 'can' meaning has to the 'shall'. I do not defend these translations, but mention them as indicating how easy the transition to the meaning of contingent determined futurity is. One may be allowed to guess that the only thing which kept the subjunctive in Greek from acquiring this meaning was the competition of the optative¹³.

(To be concluded)

SALT LAKE CITY.

FRANK H. FOWLER.

REVIEWS

A Handbook of Greek Sculpture. By Ernest Arthur Gardner. London: Macmillan and Co. (1915). Pp. 605. 10 sh.

Of Professor Gardner's well-known Handbook of Greek Sculpture a new edition is more than welcome to students of Greek art. The book originally appeared in two parts, in 1896-1897. Since that time both parts have been reprinted repeatedly, with corrections. In 1905 a revised edition was brought out and new material was added in an Appendix. This was reprinted in 1907, 1909 and 1911. In this way the book has in a measure kept pace with the new discoveries in its field. The edition now before us does not represent a rewriting, but rather the original treatise with additions. The matter which had been included in the Appendix has now been incorporated in the text and new items and new illustrations have been added. The extent of these additions may be seen from the increase in the number of pages. Thus the edition of 1896-1897 had 552 pages; that of 1911 had 591; the edition of 1915 has 605. The sculptures of Delphi are now discussed in their proper places, as are the Hermes Propylaeus of

Alcamenes, the statue of Agias, the bronze athlete from Anticythera, etc. New material includes an account of the archaic pediment group at Corcyra, but without an illustration; of the colossal Apollo of Sunium; of the youthful Apollo from the Tiber, now in the Museo delle Terme, which the author is inclined to accept as a work of Phidias; of the Athena in Frankfurt belonging to Myron's famous group; of the archaic bronze Poseidon found in the sea near Thisbe; and illustrations of Furtwängler's restoration of the Aegina pediment groups, and a restoration of the group by Damophon at Lycosura.

The general characteristics of Professor Gardner's book are so well known that it is hardly necessary to discuss his theories in detail. At the same time it will, perhaps, not be out of place to recall some of them. In the early period he is much more ready than most students of sculpture to see Egyptian influence in the beginnings of Greek art. Thus, in the case of the Nicandra statue (page 126) he finds that the treatment of the hair "can only be derived from an Egyptian model"; and again (148), in discussing a statue at Candia he says, "There is almost certainly here a convention from the Egyptian wig". Also on page 165 he says of the statues of Dermys and Citylus,

in the position of the two, each with his arm about the other's neck, and in the treatment of the hair we can see clear indication of Egyptian models. The same wig-like treatment of the hair appears also on a head and shoulders of an early figure from the Ptoan sanctuary.

At the same time he believes that Assyrian art had considerable influence on early Greek sculpture. Most archaeologists will, however, want more substantial evidence than is here presented before they are ready to believe that Greek art in its beginnings was very deeply indebted either to Egypt or to Assyria.

The sculptures of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, Professor Gardner believes, were the work of local artists, but may have been designed by Paeonius and Alcamenes. To that extent he thinks the statement of Pausanias may be right, although the improbabilities are great.

He rejects the Apollo of the Omphalos as a work of Calamis, and argues that to obtain an appreciation of his style we must look to a development from the female figures of the Acropolis. He finds this in the bronze charioteer from Delphi, which he thinks may be a genuine work of this master.

Lysippos, he holds, is to be judged by the Agias, which was a genuine work superior to the Apoxyomenos, which was the product of his school.

The importance of Scopas and his influence upon his contemporaries and later artists is rightly emphasized; but Professor Gardner believes that the female figure found by Mendel at Tegea in 1901 was the *Atalanta* of the pediment and that it affords a criterion by which to judge Scopas's female heads.

The so-called Eubuleus he thinks does not go back to Praxiteles, but is a Hellenistic work, and its identifica-

¹²Apparently the original force of $\delta\upsilon$ and $\kappa\epsilon$ was 'under the circumstances'.

¹³Concerning the disappearance of the subjunctive of determined futurity in post-Homeric Greek see Gildersleeve, A. J. P. 29.267: "I should say that the real competitor of the 'futural' subjunctive is the optative with $\delta\upsilon$"